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MELENDEZ-DIAZ AND THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
CRAIG M. BRADLEY*
INTRODUCTION
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,l the United States Supreme Court
hewed to its holding in Crawford v. Washington2 and decided that reports
of scientific tests cannot be introduced as evidence in a criminal trial with-
out live testimony by the person who wrote the report. 3 This holding was
based on the definition of "testimonial" developed in Crawford, but will
likely result in hundreds of pending cases, 4 and an unknown, but much
smaller number of future cases becoming un-prosecutable because such
analysts are not available to testify at the trial. Nevertheless, I agree with
the basic thrust of the opinion because defendants should have the opportu-
nity to cross-examine those who have prepared scientific reports that may
be the basis of their convictions. Still, I remain unconvinced by the Su-
preme Court's reading of the Sixth Amendment as to the definition of
"witness" and argue that the Crawford/Melendez-Diaz approach is both too
narrow and too broad.
In Melendez-Diaz, the defendant was charged with distributing co-
caine in an amount between fourteen and twenty-eight grams.5 He was
convicted on the basis of "certificates of analysis" that declared the sub-
stance's weight and that the substance seized from him was cocaine. 6 No
person appeared before the trial court to verify the conclusions in the cer-
tificates.7 The petitioner's objections, based on the Confrontation Clause,
were overruled, and his conviction was affirmed by the Massachusetts ap-
pellate courts. 8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the con-
* Robert A. Lucas Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington, Maurer School of Law.
The author would like to thank Professors Joe Hoffmann, Robert Mosteller and Aviva Orenstein for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, No. 07-951 (U.S. June 25, 2009).
2. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3. Melendez-Diaz, No. 07-951, slip op. at 23.
4. See Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51 (1985).
5. Melendez-Diaz, No. 07-951, slip op. at 2.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 3.
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viction.9
The Court's decision was based on its interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment developed in Crawford. According to Crawford, defendants
have the right to cross-examine people who offer "testimony" against
them. 10 While it seems obvious to me that everyone who testifies for the
prosecution, whether offering live or hearsay testimony, is a "witness"
against the defendant under the terms of the Sixth Amendment, the Su-
preme Court does not mean that when it says "testimony." Rather, certain
hearsay, without the presence of the declarant, is still admissible against
defendants under the Crawford holding because these statements-
including most of the content of 911 calls and various other statements that
may incriminate defendants-are not considered "testimony" by the Court.
That is to say, defendants are offered no protection under the Confrontation
Clause when a witness gives a statement that the Court deems "nontesti-
monial" hearsay." l
The Melendez-Diaz Court quoted the following passage from Craw-
ford as to what is "testimonial":
Various formulations of this core class of "testimonial" statements exist:
"ex parte in court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, mate-
rial such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially"; "ex-
trajudicial statements... contained in formalized testimonial materials,
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions"; [and]
"statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial.... 12
By contrast, statements about "events as they were actually happening,"
such as 911 calls, are considered "nontestimonial" and therefore are not
subject to cross-examination, as opposed to statements "describing [to the
police] past events" which are considered "testimonial" and are subject to
cross-examination. 13
In Melendez-Diaz the Court held that "[t]he documents at issue here,
9. Id.
10. 541 U.S. at 51-52 (2004).
11. This was made clear in Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007) ("Crawford [elimi-
nates] Confrontation Clause protection against the admission of unreliable out-of-court nontestimonial
statements."); see also Robert P. Mosteller, Confrontation as Constitutional Criminal Procedure:
Crawford's Birth Did Not Require That Roberts Had to Die, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 685 (2007) (questioning
this holding because of the value of providing some protection for what the Court deems nontestimonial
hearsay). My proposal would provide full protection for both "testimonial" and "nontestimonial" hear-
say.
12. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted).
13. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006).
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while denominated by Massachusetts law 'certificates,' are quite plainly
affidavits" and are "functionally identical to live, in court testimony, doing
precisely what a witness does on direct examination."' 14 Therefore, the
Court held that they were "testimonial" and, accordingly, that the author of
the certificate must appear at trial to be subject to cross-examination by the
defendant, rather than just submit the certificates. 15
My difficulty with this holding lies not with the result but with the
Court's entire approach to the Sixth Amendment. The result in many cases
not only reflects the apparent meaning of the Sixth Amendment, but it also
comes to the only fair outcome. There are too many examples of faulty
scientific testing leading to false convictions (as discussed by the Court)
16
to allow "scientific tests" to be used automatically in criminal trials without
being subject to cross-examination. Rather, my objection is that the Court's
definition of "testimony" is too narrow because it allows certain hearsay
statements that cry out for cross-examination to be used against defendants.
But the definition of "testimony" is also too broad because it does not rec-
ognize that a more extensive Sixth Amendment privilege can also be sub-
ject to certain practical exceptions, as the Court has done with the Sixth
Amendment's right to counsel.' 7
Establishing a wooden rule that all scientific reports must be subject to
cross-examination, regardless of whether the defendant has any need to do
so, will mean that much scientific evidence will be lost because of the un-
availability of the analyst, who may have, in some cases, performed the test
years before and is now dead or otherwise truly unavailable. There is a
middle ground between the extremes announced by the majority (scientific
reports are always subject to cross-examination) and the dissent (scientific
reports are never subject to cross-examination) that is more obviously justi-
fied by the terms of the Sixth Amendment itself. To discover this middle
ground requires an examination of Crawford, its predecessor Ohio v. Rob-
erts,18 and other cases in which the Court has tried to explicate its rule re-
garding the scope of the right to confrontation.
I. BACKGROUND
In Crawford, the Supreme Court vitalized, to some extent, the defen-
dant's right to confront witnesses against him by overruling Ohio v. Rob-
14. No. 07-95 1, slip op. at 4 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 830).
15. Id. at 4-5.
16. Id. at 13.
17. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that the Constitution requires only that no
indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him
the right to counsel).
18. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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erts. Roberts held that the defendant's confrontation right did not bar ad-
mission of an unavailable witness' hearsay statement against the defendant
if the statement bore "adequate 'indicia of reliability."'"19 This test was
satisfied when evidence either fell within a "firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion" or exhibited "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
'20
The problem with Roberts was that once a court determined that a
given type of statement fell within one of many hearsay exceptions, such as
an "excited utterance," the statement was admitted against the defendant,
regardless of whether cross-examination might have exposed some weak-
ness in the statement in an individual case. Thus, as Professor Richard
Friedman has pointed out, under the Roberts regime:
[T]he Clause... had only a very limited effect. The lower courts usually
could find a basis for admitting a statement, either by fitting it within an
exemption or making a case-specific determination of reliability. And
though the Supreme Court occasionally swooped down and held the ad-
mission of a given statement to be a violation of the Clause, the law was
highly unpredictable because it was not rooted in any solid underlying
theory.21
The Washington Supreme Court opinion in Crawford was a good ex-
ample of the cavalier attitude toward confrontation rights that had been
exhibited by the lower courts. In that case, the defendant stabbed a man
who allegedly had tried to rape his wife on a previous occasion. 22 The de-
fendant claimed that the stabbing was in self-defense. 23 His wife, who was
present at the stabbing, was unavailable to testify because of the spousal
privilege. 24 However, the prosecution got around this by introducing her
statement to the police that contradicted the self-defense claim. 25 The
Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on the ground that the
wife's statement "bore guarantees of trustworthiness" because it partially
interlocked with the defendant's own statement.26 That is to say, much of
what the wife said agreed with what the defendant said, except when it
incriminated the defendant.27
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 28 The Court properly held
19. Id. at66.
20. Id.
21. Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis and Way Beyond, 15 J. L. & POL'Y 553, 554 (2007).
22. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004).




27. See id. at 41-42.
28. Id. at 69.
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that the Clause's protection is not limited to those who "actually testify at
trial" but extends to those "whose [hearsay] statements are offered at
trial."'29 But the Court, after a lengthy disquisition on the history of the
Confrontation Clause, went on to explain that not all hearsay statements
offered at trial are covered by the Clause, because the Clause is primarily
concerned with those statements that were "testimonial" at the time they
were made.30
As to the difference between testimonial and nontestimonial state-
ments, the Court declined to spell out a "comprehensive definition."' 31 But
it did hold that
[w]hatever else the term [testimonial] covers, it applies at a minimum to
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a for-
mer trial; and to police interrogations. These are the modem practices
with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed. 32
Concurring, Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that
[t]he Court's distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial state-
ments, contrary to its claim, is no better rooted in history than our current
doctrine.... [W]hile I agree that the framers were mainly concerned
about swom affidavits and depositions, it does not follow that they were
similarly concerned about the Court's broader category of testimonial
statements. 33
While Rehnquist was right about history, his view-leaving the Con-
frontation right to the tender mercies of state court hearsay doctrine-was
worse than the result in Crawford, which at least gave some content to the
constitutional right.
In 2006, the Court set out to better explain what it meant by "testimo-
nial" versus "nontestimonial" in the combined cases of Davis v. Washing-
ton 34 and Hammon v. Indiana.35 In Davis the issue was whether the
contents of a 911 call could be used against the defendant in the absence of
29. Id. at 43.
30. Id. at 51-52. That "nontestimonial" statements were not covered at all by the Clause was only
made clear in the subsequent case of Davis v. Washington. 547 U.S. 813, 824-25 (2006).
31. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
32. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 69-71 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). Subsequently, Professor Thomas
Davies, after a thorough examination of the subject, concluded that the Court was wrong in its historical
analysis. Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional
Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 105, 189-206 (2005). Compare id., with
Akhil Reed Amar, THE CONSTITUrION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 125-31 (1997), and Richard
Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998) (both relied on by
Crawford as advancing the Court's view of history).
34. 547 U.S. at 817.
35. Id.
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the declarant. Hammon concerned a statement to the police by a battered
woman after they had responded to a domestic disturbance call. The Court
held that the 911 call in Davis was nontestimonial and consequently could
be used at the defendant's trial.36 The statement to the police in Hammon,
by contrast, was considered testimonial and its use was a violation of the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.37
In the course of distinguishing between these two statements, the
Court made further declarations as to the testimonial/nontestimonial dis-
tinction:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police inter-
rogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an on-
going emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objec-
tively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. 38
Later the Court said that the difference in result between Davis and
Crawford was that in Crawford the interrogation was "solely directed at
establishing the facts of the past crime," whereas in Davis the declarant
"was speaking about events as they were actually happening rather than
describing past events."'39 But, at some point, a 911 call may shift to "ques-
tions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect," at
which point, it is by definition testimonial and not admissible. 40 How the
Court derived all of this from the history of the Sixth Amendment, which,
of course, predated police forces as we know them (not to mention 911
calls), is a mystery.
More importantly, this apparent focus on the intent of the questioner is
extremely unhelpful. During the course of their interviews with witnesses,
police and 911 operators are likely to have the intent both to defuse the
emergency and to capture and prosecute the perpetrator. For example, if
police arrive on the scene of a domestic battery after the perpetrator has
fled and ask the woman to describe the perpetrator and whether he was
armed, are they asking "questions necessary to secure their own safety or
the safety of the public" (nontestimonial says the Court) or "questions de-
signed solely to elicit testimonial evidence" (testimonial says the Court)?4 1
36. Id. at 827-28.
37. Id. at 831-32.
38. Id. at 822.
39. Id. at 826-27 (emphasis in original).
40. Id. at 829.
41. Id.
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Because the officer's purpose is likely mixed-he wants to protect himself
and the public from a possibly armed criminal, and he wants to develop
evidence for possible prosecution-this question is not "solely" designed to
elicit testimonial evidence. But earlier the Court had said that it was the
"primary purpose" of the interrogation that counted, 42 and that will be very
hard to gauge. This requires the very sort of probing of the mind of the
police that the Court has condemned in the Fourth Amendment context.
4 3
Likewise, if we focus on the temporal distinction that the Court em-
phasized-whether the declarant is speaking about events as they are "ac-
tually happening" or "describing past events"-the
testimonial/nontestimonial distinction is still unclear. In the example above,
while the emergency of the woman being battered is over, a second emer-
gency, of a possibly armed batterer at large, is still ongoing. Thus the po-
lice question: "did he take the knife with him or leave it in the house?" has
both evidence gathering (testimonial) and emergency defusing (nontesti-
monial) aspects.
But the main problem is not that Crawford/Davis has given rise to dif-
ficult questions. Rather, it is that the testimonial/nontestimonial distinction
has nothing to do with the defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses
against him. As noted, the Court was correct in Crawford to make it clear
that the confrontation right was not limited to live testimony in court but
extended to the use of hearsay statements by declarants who are not pre-
sent. But given the right, why should the Court snatch it away in cases
where it deems a hearsay statement "nontestimonial?" The defendant's
need to cross-examine the declarant is no less when the statement is made
to police or 911 operators while the defendant is still there than it is after he
has fled.
"Nontestimonial" statements include not only 911 calls reporting on-
going emergencies, but also, as the Court explained in the subsequent case
of Giles v. California,44 "[s]tatements to friends and neighbors about abuse
and intimidation, and statements to physicians in the course of receiving
treatment. '45 But surely all of these statements are at least as likely as
statements to the police to benefit from cross-examination. For example,
suppose a woman calling 911 to report domestic abuse shouts, "he's trying
to kill me!" According to the Court this "nontestimonial" hearsay statement
42. Id. at 822.
43. "[T]he subjective motivations of individual officers have no bearing on whether a search is
,unreasonable' under the Fourth Amendment." Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404-05 (2006)
(citations omitted).
44. No. 07-6053, slip op. at I (U.S. June 25, 2008).
45. Id. at 22.
20l1
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is admissible, despite the unavailability of the declarant for cross-
examination. But she might very well admit on cross-examination that she
did not really think he was trying to kill her and this declaration was made
in the heat and fear of the moment. And why should the defendant's right
to confrontation not extend to statements to friends and neighbors by the
victim? The Court cannot explain this one because in Davis it held that "a
young rape victim's" explanation of the circumstances of the rape to her
mother was "an account of past events and consequently 'testimonial' 46-
the opposite of what it said in Giles.47
The Court's answer (except for the confusion just noted) is: "the his-
tory made us do it!" But, as previously noted, the history in no way com-
pels the Court's testimonial/nontestimonial distinction, especially as to
police questioning (not to mention 911 operators) since there were no po-
lice at common law. Crawford went wrong in the following passage:
The text of the Confrontation Clause ... applies to "witnesses" against
the accused-in other words, those who "bear testimony." "Testimony,"
in turn, is typically a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the pur-
pose of establishing or proving some fact. An accuser who makes a for-
mal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a
person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.48
This statement involves a subtle shift in the meaning of the term "tes-
timony." Leaving aside the various and conflicting views of the historical
meaning of "testimony," it seems obvious that "testimony" in the context
of the Confrontation Clause refers to what occurs at trial. Statements of-
fered by the prosecution to prove its case against the defendant, whether
through live witnesses or hearsay, are "testimony" and the people who
offer those statements are "witnesses." And that is what we, and the Fram-
ers, have always called them. Statements by people which are not offered
by the prosecution to prove its case against the defendant are not "testi-
mony."'49 It does not matter what the intent of the police was in obtaining a
statement, nor the intent of the declarant in giving it. No one would argue,
for example, that if the police took statements from ten people concerning a
crime and the prosecution used only two of those as witnesses at trial, the
defendant's right to cross-examination should extend to the other eight
people. He may have a right to discover those statements and to use those
46. 547 U.S. at 828.
47. No. 07-6053, slip op. at 22.
48. 541 U.S. 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
49. Grand jury testimony is, of course, "testimony." However, since a grand jury is not part of a
"criminal case," the defendant's right does not extend into its chambers. But grand jury testimony
cannot be used in court unless the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
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witnesses himself,50 but this has nothing to do with his right to confronta-
tion.
By contrast the defendant does, according to the Sixth Amendment,
have a right to "confront" (i.e. cross-examine) "the witnesses against
him."' 51 This, self-evidently, applies to all witnesses offered by the prosecu-
tion to prove its case, whether as live witnesses or through hearsay testi-
mony.
II. EXCEPTIONS
Having established that the only sensible way to view the defendant's
confrontation right is that it applies to all statements offered against him at
trial, including those of scientific analysts, the remaining question is
whether the law should recognize any exceptions. As usual, the answer
must be "yes." Sometimes the defendant's right must give way to reason-
able limitations that ensure the efficient conduct of trials. For example, in
Scott v. Illinois52 the Court did not deny that trials in which prison sen-
tences are not imposed are "criminal trials" under the Sixth Amendment to
which the right to counsel would apply. Nevertheless the Court refused to
extend the right to free counsel to such cases on practical grounds: such
application "would create confusion and impose unpredictable, but neces-
sarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States. '53 The Court, of course,
has made similar accommodations to practicality in limiting the First
Amendment's absolute command that "Congress shall make no
law.., abridging the freedom of speech."
'54
In Melendez-Diaz the Court continues its historic practice of recogniz-
ing exceptions to the Confrontation Clause. In addition to the "nontestimo-
nial" exception previously discussed, at least three further exceptions are
specifically recognized, though these are evidently just examples of "non-
testimonial" statements.55 These exceptions are apparently designed to be
50. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Court emphasized the difference between the
defendant's right to call witnesses under the Compulsory Process clause of the Sixth Amendment and
his right to confront them. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, No. 07-951, slip op. at 7 (U.S. June 25,
2009).
51. U.S. Const. amend. VI. As the dissenters in Melendez-Diaz pointed out, we must not focus too
strongly on what the Framers may have understood the word "testimony" to mean because that word is
not in the Sixth Amendment. No. 07-951, slip op. at I (Kennedy, J., dissenting). But contrary to the
view of the dissent, scientific analysts who testify against the defendant are also, obviously, "witnesses
against" him.
52. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
53. Id. at 373.
54. U.S. Const. amend. I. See, for example, Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), where
the "clear and present danger" exception to the Amendment's absolute command was adumbrated.
55. "Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that ... were not testimonial." Melendez-
Diaz, No. 07-951, slip op. at 18.
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applied automatically in every case, regardless of the fact that, in a particu-
lar case, the defendant might have a need to cross-examine the witness in
question. The first exception is business records. The Court makes it clear
that while records of scientific tests have sometimes been included in the
"business records" exception, they should not be because they were pre-
pared for use at trial.56
The Court is also clear, however, that ordinary business records that
were not so prepared remain an automatic exception to the Confrontation
Clause. 57 This will lead to an unacceptable dichotomy. If a hospital has a
record of a blood test of the defendant, or some other witness, that was
originally made for medical, rather than prosecutorial purposes, that blood
test is automatically admissible as "nontestimonial" regardless of the ab-
sence of the analyst and regardless of what deficiencies that the defense
attorney might have reason to raise about the lab's procedures. But if the
test is performed for the purposes of trial, then cross-examination of the
analyst is required, 58 even if the defense attorney has no basis to challenge
the results. Are not the analysts who prepared the report "witnesses" in
either case?
Secondly, the Court recognizes that "a clerk's certificate authenticat-
ing an official record-or a copy thereof-for use in evidence" is an addi-
tional exception. But though a clerk could "by affidavit authenticate or
provide a copy of an otherwise admissible record [he] could not do what
the analysts did here: create a record for the sole purpose of providing evi-
dence against a defendant."'59
While both business records and clerk's certificates will, in 99% of
cases, be reliable, why should there be a blanket rule that they are always
admissible without cross-examination? 60 If the defendant can demonstrate
some reason why cross-examination has a reasonable prospect of challeng-
ing the reliability of this evidence, then cross-examination must be allowed.
If not, the records should be admitted. It is certainly easy to see, for exam-
ple, why some of Bernard Madoff's business records, though not prepared
with an eye toward use in court, might be unreliable and that their unreli-
56. Id. at 16.
57. "Documents kept in the regular course of business may ordinarily be admitted at trial despite
their hearsay status." Id. at 15.
58. See State v. Johnson, 982 So. 2d 672, 676-78 (Fla. 2008) (making this distinction). This case
was cited with approval in Melendez-Diaz. See, No. 07-951, slip op. at 20 n. 1I.
59. Melendez-Diaz, No. 07-951, slip op. at 16-17 (emphasis in original).
60. The Federal Rules of Evidence require that both business and public records be "trustworthy."
FED. R. EVID. 803(6), (8). But without cross-examination, and given the widespread belief that they are
trustworthy, this would seem to be an empty requirement.
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ability might affect the guilt or innocence of one of his associates.61
The proper way to view the Sixth Amendment is that it applies, as it
says, to all witnesses against the defendant-that is to say, everybody who
testifies for the prosecution, whether as a live witness or through hearsay.
62
However, as in Scott, we must further recognize that, as a practical matter,
there must be some limitation lest we grind trials to a halt by requiring
testimony when it is totally unnecessary. The solution is simply that the
defense attorney must offer some reasonable explanation of why she needs
to cross-examine the declarant of a given hearsay statement. If she cannot
offer such an explanation, any cross-examination would have been futile
anyway.
This approach is totally different than the old approach in Ohio v.
Roberts. It is similar to Roberts in that it calls for a case-by-case decision-
one that only comes up after the prosecution has established that the decla-
rant is unavailable. But unlike Roberts, it is irrelevant whether a given
piece of evidence "bears adequate 'indicia of reliability"' or "falls within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception. '63 Moreover, the defense attorney need
only offer a reasonable explanation of why cross-examination is necessary
in order for the witness to be required to be produced, or his hearsay state-
ment excluded.
In the usual case of scientific or business records, the defense attorney
will have no such reason. The Court's ruling in Melendez-Diaz will simply
be an attendance requirement. Once the prosecution has demonstrated that
it can produce the witness, the defense will waive the testimony because to
have it, with no effective cross-examination, will only reinforce the prose-
cution's case. 64 But if the defense attorney has some articulable reason to
doubt the competence or honesty of the business or scientific record, then
she will have a reason to demand that the declarant testify and the judge
order the prosecution to produce the witness. As it is, under the absolute
rule of Melendez-Diaz, some prosecutions will fail, not because there was
any reason to produce the witness for cross-examination, but simply be-
61. The final category set forth by the Court is "statements in furtherance of a conspiracy."
Melendez-Diaz, No. 07-951, slip op. at 18. Though it is unclear why these statements by criminals
among themselves are thought to bear any "indicia of reliability," they are clearly "nontestimonial"
under the Crawford definition.
62. In an article immediately following Crawford, Professor Miguel Mendez proposed extending
the Sixth Amendment right to include "nontestimonial statements" but did not further propose the
limitation of the right to a "reasonable need to cross-examine" as I suggest. Crawford v. Washington: A
Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569, 609 (2004).
63. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
64. In my three and a half years as a prosecutor in Washington, D.C., I cannot recall a case in
which a defense attorney was able to make any headway in cross-examining the expert, even though we
regularly produced scientific experts for testimony.
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cause the witness could not be produced.
United States v. Feliz,65 a Second Circuit case that had reached the
opposite conclusion from Melendez-Diaz, provides a thoughtful explana-
tion of why the Melendez-Diaz result will cause unnecessary trouble when
applied to autopsies:
Years may pass between the performance of the autopsy and the appre-
hension of the perpetrator. This passage of time can easily lead to the un-
availability of the examiner who prepared the report. Moreover, medical
examiners who regularly perform hundreds of autopsies are unlikely to
have any independent recollection of the autopsy at issue in a particular
case and in testifying invariably rely entirely on the autopsy report.
Unlike other forensic tests, an autopsy cannot be replicated by another
pathologist. Certainly it would be against society's interests to permit the
unavailability of the medical examiner who prepared the report to pre-
clude the prosecution of a homicide case.66
The Melendez-Diaz Court claims that these sorts of concerns are over-
blown, arguing, for example, that only a small percentage of drug cases
"actually proceed to trial."'67 But this is beside the point. In this entire dis-
cussion, we have only been concerned with cases that "actually go to trial."
The question is how those cases will be affected. And many more such
cases will either go to trial or be dismissed now that the analysts must ap-
pear. As the dissent points out, under the Court's ruling, in Philadelphia,
for example, "each of the city's 18 drug analysts will be required to testify
in more than 69 trials next year," with much more time spent waiting
around the courthouse than actually testifying.
68
Nevertheless, while this holding will cause many completed cases to
now be dismissed because the analyst did not appear at trial, going forward,
as the Court points out, the impact of this ruling will not result in many lost
cases because now that they know that they have to, prosecutors will pro-
duce the analysts to testify. State v. Johnson69 is a typical case. In that case,
the drug analyst had left Florida and was working for the FBI in Virginia.
65. 467 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2006).
66. Id. at 236 (quoting People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 869 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005)). Professor
Friedman has suggested getting around this problem with regard to autopsies by having two patholo-
gists conduct every autopsy in the hope that one will still be available when the trial takes place, thus
requiring states to dramatically increase their coroner staffs. See Richard D. Friedman, Thoughts on
Melendez-Diaz: chain of custody, products of a machine, who must testify, etc.,
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2008/1 1/thoughts-on-melendez-diaz-chain-of.html (Nov. 13,
2008, 6:24 PM).
67. No. 07-951, slip op. at 20 (U.S. June 25, 2009).
68. Id. at 13 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent continues: "Itlhe Court's decision means that
before any of those million [FBI lab] tests reaches a jury, at least one of the laboratory's analysts must
board a plane, find his or her way to an unfamiliar courthouse, and sit there waiting to read aloud notes
made months ago." Id. at 14.
69. 982 So.2d 672 (Fla. 2008).
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The state took the position that she was "unavailable" because it would be
an "unreasonable expense and inconvenience" to fly her in for the trial.
70
The trial court agreed, but the Florida Supreme Court, following Crawford,
reversed the conviction on Confrontation Clause grounds. 71 Obviously, if it
knew it had to, the State could have made her available and the conviction
need not have been lost.72 But, as noted above, the cost in manpower will
be great.
Under my approach, at some point before the trial, in order to compel
her attendance, the defense attorney would have to offer the court some
reason why he needed to cross-examine the expert before her attendance
would be compelled. It could be argued that "the only way he can find out
about problems in the lab is through cross-examination." This, in all but the
rarest case, gives cross-examination more credit than it deserves. If the
defense attorney is simply on a fishing expedition hoping, with no basis, to
uncover some defect in the lab procedures, it is unlikely that cross-
examination of the analyst will uncover this. However, if he has some rea-
son to believe there are problems in the lab (whether through newspaper
accounts of problems in the lab, information obtained from other defense
attorneys, or the like), then he has the reason needed to demand the appear-
ance of the analyst and subject her to cross-examination.
While scientific experts will rarely be truly unavailable for trial, other
witnesses, covered under my proposed elimination of the testimo-
nial/nontestimonial distinction, will more frequently be unavailable. Bat-
tered women will have fled to unknown locations or refuse to come to
court. Other witnesses will simply have disappeared or died, and the hus-
band-wife privilege, as in Crawford,73 may keep witnesses off the stand. In
those cases, if the defense attorney can give a reason why he needs to
cross-examine them-which will ordinarily be obvious (as it was in Craw-
ford)-then the witness's testimony cannot be used. This will confer a far
greater benefit on defendants than the off-chance that cross-examination of
a scientific expert might turn up some unexpected flaw in her testimony.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court, beginning with Crawford, has imposed a "testimo-
70. Id. at 674.
71. Id. at 681.
72. Still, as the dissent again notes: "Guilty defendants will go free.... The analyst will not
always make it to the courthouse in time. He or she may be ill; may be out of the country; may be
unable to travel due to inclement weather; or may at that very moment be waiting outside some other
courtroom for another defendant to exercise the right the Court invents today." Melendez-Diaz, No. 07-
951, slip op. at 14 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
73. 541 U.S. 36,40(2004).
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nial/nontestimonial" distinction on the Sixth Amendment that depends on
the nature of the statement at the time it was made. That distinction is not
supported by either the history or the language of the Amendment. The
defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to confront all witnesses against
him as its language suggests. "Testimonial" statements are those offered by
the prosecution in trial testimony against the defendant. They do not in-
clude statements of witnesses to the crime that are not, for whatever reason,
offered by the prosecution at trial. The way to deal with the practical prob-
lems posed by this broad approach to the Sixth Amendment right is to sim-
ply recognize, as the Supreme Court did regarding the right to counsel in
Scott v. Illinois, that a broad constitutional right can be subject to practical
limitations: in this case, that the defense attorney must offer a reasonable
explanation of why he needs to cross-examine a government witness before
the government will be required to produce that witness.
Ordinarily it will be obvious why cross-examination is reasonable. But
in the case of witnesses testifying as to business records or the results of
scientific tests, it will not be obvious and in most, but not all, cases, such
records or tests will be admitted without the necessity of the person who
prepared them being available for trial. But when the defense attorney can
articulate a reason to suspect problems with the tests, the analyst must be
produced and the defense attorney allowed to cross-examine.
What is the future of confrontation law? This turns out to be a vexing
question since, no sooner did the Court decide Melendez-Diaz than it
granted certiorari in Briscoe v. Virginia.74 In the appellate decision that led
to the petition of the United States Supreme Court,75 the Virginia Supreme
Court upheld a scheme in which objection to an analyst's non-appearance
was deemed waived unless the defense attorney called her as his own wit-
ness. Since Melendez-Diaz concluded that the power to subpoena witnesses
is "no substitute for the right of confrontation," 76 it seems clear that this
Virginia scheme is flatly unacceptable under Melendez-Diaz. Why then did
the Court grant certiorari in this case rather than simply sending it back to
Virginia to be reversed? Maybe the Melendez-Diaz dissenters voted for
certiorari in hopes to attracting a fifth vote in Justice Sotomayor next year.
Alternatively, the majority may want to disapprove the Virginia approach
but adopt something similar to my approach where appearance of the ex-
pert is waived unless the defense attorney can show good cause to cross-
74. Magruder v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 113 (Va. 2008), cert. granted sub noma. Briscoe v.
Virginia, 77 U.S.L.W. 3709 (U.S. June 29, 2009) (No. 07-11191).
75. Magruder, 657 S.E.2d at 124.
76. Melendez-Diaz, No. 07-95 1, slip op. at 19.
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examine.77 This would solve the overbreadth problem of Melendez-Diaz,
but not the narrowness flaw of the entire line of Crawford cases.
77. See Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 482 (2006) (noting
that some states have "notice and demand" statutes requiring the expert to appear if demanded by the
defense or, in some states, demanded upon a showing of good cause). The Court spoke approvingly of
such schemes in Melendez-Diaz, and I agree that they would meet constitutional requirements. See
Melendez-Diaz, No. 07-951, slip op. at 20.
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